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I. JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2-2(3)© (2001). 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. The trial court properly refused to grant additur, or in the alternative 
a new trial, on the general damages of $ 1.00 that the jury awarded to the Wests. Whether 
the trial court properly denied a motion for additur, or in the alternative a new trial, is 
reviewed "to determine whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of its discretion/' 
Neelev v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, T]10, 51 P.3d 724. In reviewing the judge's 
ultimate decision to grant or deny additur or a new trial, this Court will reverse only if 
there is no reasonable basis for the decision. See Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 
817 P.2d 789, 805 (Utah 1991); see also Neelev, 2002 UT App 189 at ^10. 
2. The trial court properly refused to grant additur, or in the alternative 
a new trial, for the jury's refusal to award Mr. West any damages related to his Spinal 
Cord Stimulator claim. As stated above, whether the trial court properly denied a motion 
for additur, or in the alternative a new trial, is reviewed "to determine whether the trial 
court exceeded the bounds of its discretion." Neelev, 2002 UT App 189 at H10. In 
reviewing the judge's ultimate decision to grant or deny a new trial, this Court will 
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reverse only if there is no reasonable basis for the decision. See Crookston, 817 P.2d at 
805; see also Neeley, 2002 UT App 189 at T|10. 
3. The trial court properly conducted post-impanelment questioning of 
juror Weinmuller regarding her alleged misconduct and biases. The scope of post-
impanelment questioning "'is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and 
its ruling with respect thereto will not be disturbed absent a demonstrated abuse of 
discretion.'" Rasmussen v. Sharapata, 895 P.2d 391, 394 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quotation 
omitted). 
4. The trial court properly determined that no sufficient basis existed 
which would have required striking juror Weinmuller for cause. 'The law on voir dire of 
jury panels is instructive in helping us assess whether post-impanelment questioning of a 
juror was proper. The scope of such questioning 'is a matter within the sound discretion 
of the trial court, and its rulings with respect thereto will not be disturbed on appeal 
absent a demonstrated abuse of discretion.'" Rasmussen, 895 P.2d at 394 (quotation 
omitted); see also State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, 1J25, 24 P.3d 948 (stating "[w]e start with 
the traditional and sound rule that a trial court's determination of whether to excuse a ... 
juror for cause should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. We review such a 
decision with just deference because of the 'trial judge's somewhat advantaged position 
in determining which persons would be fair and impartial jurors.'") (quotation omitted). 
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5. The trial court properly determined that the Wests were not entitled 
to a new trial because it would not have dismissed juror Weinmuller for cause during voir 
dire. "The trial court's conclusion that the McDonough test was not satisfied is a legal 
conclusion that we review for correctness, while the trial court's decision to deny [the 
Wests'] motion for a new trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." State 
v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, ^26, 20 P.3d 888. 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In this case, appellants Stephen and Holley West ("the Wests") brought suit 
against appellee Jeffery Holley ("Holley") for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of a 
low impact, parking lot automobile accident on January 7, 2000. A jury trial was held 
and the jury returned a verdict finding Holley 95% negligent and Mr. West 5% negligent. 
The jury awarded Mr. West $8,040 in special damages and $1.00 in general damages. 
The jury awarded Mrs. West $3,000 in special damages and $1.00 in general damages. 
The Wests then filed a Motion for Additur or in the Alternative Motion for 
New Trial or Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, attacking the sufficiency of the 
verdict and questioning the behavior of one particular juror. After hearing oral arguments 
on the motion, the trial court entered a Memorandum Decision dated December 7, 2001, 
denying the Wests' motion for additur but reserving for ruling the motion for new trial 
based on juror misconduct until testimony from the juror in question could be heard. On 
December 12, 2001, the trial court heard testimony from juror Susan Weinmuller, and 
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denied the motion for new trial based on alleged juror misconduct. An Order denying the 
Wests' motion for new trial based on juror misconduct was entered on February 26, 2002. 
IV- STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. On August 25, 2000, the Wests filed a Complaint against Holley 
seeking compensation for injuries allegedly sustained in an automobile accident that 
occurred between them on January 7, 2000, in a Costco parking lot in Orem, Utah. See 
R.l-3. 
2. The Wests alleged in the Complaint that Holley negligently operated 
his vehicle causing it to collide with them. See id. 
3. The case was tried to a jury. On the first day of trial, August 14, 
2001, voir dire began. The question the trial court asked the jury venire on the issue of 
whether anyone had been involved in a lawsuit was: 
Okay. Now this next question, I'm going to say anyone or a 
close family member, and I want to define that. Pm talking 
about you, yourself. And when I say "close family 
member," I'm talking a spouse, a child, a sibling, or a 
parent. Okay. So you, your spouse, your children, your 
mom, your dad, your brothers, or your sisters. Have any of 
you or a close family member been involved in a civil 
lawsuit as a plaintiff or a defendant or a witness? 
R.631at pp.52-53 (emphasis added). 
4. Potential juror Susan Weinmuller made no response to this question. 
See id. at pp.53-59. 
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5. During voir dire, juror Susan Weinmuller gave the following 
information to the court: 
MS. WEINMULLER: My name is Susan Weinmuller. 
I'm a resident of Provo. I'm a retired business woman for a 
corporation in California. We were also - we also had a 
business here of property management; our own properties. 
Educational background, I'm an accountant. I was always a 
business manager. I've been married for 41 years. My 
spouse is a retired business corporation owner. We have three 
children; 40, the 37 year old is an officer out of American 
Fork, and the 34 year old is an officer in Provo for 11 years 
now. I'm not a native of Utah. I'm from Brooklyn, New 
York. I've been here in Utah ten years now. I belong to my 
church. And magazines, I read a vast amount of magazines. I 
like Newsweek, and I like Reader's Digest and church 
magazines. My favorite book is Jane Eyre. And I spend my 
leisurely time as a church service missionary. 
R.631 atp.31. 
6. Later in the voir dire, the following information was also provided: 
THE COURT: And there's a disease, I guess it could 
be called, or a syndrome that's been called Chronic Regional 
Pain Syndrome, also called CRPS. Have any of you or any 
close family members had experience or been involved with 
CRPS, also known as Chronic Regional Pain Syndrome? I 
see a couple of hands. Anybody in the back? Next row 
forward? Next row? Ms. Weinmuller? 
MS. WEINMULLER: My mother had a severe fall on 
ice in New York, and she hit the subway steel steps, and she's 
had problems all of her life. 
THE COURT: She's had pain all of her life? 
MS. WEINMULLER: All of her life. 
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THE COURT: Has it been diagnosed as CRPS. 
MS. WEINMULLER: Yes. And she's on medication. 
THE COURT: All right. Anyone else in that row? 
The next row forward? The front row? Then I will - I'm 
only speaking to you [Ms. Weinmuller]. Of course, that's a 
diagnosis that has to be made in each case. Can you set aside 
your mother's situation and conditions entirely and judge this 
case based on the evidence and facts presented? 
MS. WEINMULLER: Yes. 
SeeR.631 atpp.72-73. 
7. With regards to injuries resulting from the accident, Mr. and Mrs. 
West both claimed that they suffered temporary, soft tissue spinal injuries. See R.638 at 
p.74;R.645atpp.l6-17. 
8. In addition, Mr. West alleged that this accident caused a lead 
connected to his already-implanted spinal cord stimulator (hereafter "SCS") to move and 
thereby not properly block the nerve in his spine that controlled his pre-existing left knee 
pain. SeeR.629atpp.l3-14. 
9. In 1992, Mr. West had sustained a left knee injury at work. See 
R.638 at pp.76-82. 
10. After his knee pain continued for years, one of Mr. West's doctors 
diagnosed him with chronic regional pain syndrome ("CRPS"). See id- at p.93. 
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11. In February 1999, an SCS was surgically implanted to provide relief 
to his constant knee pain. See id- at p. 106. 
12. Unfortunately, the SCS leads, which extended with a wire up into his 
spine, were not anchored by the surgeon during implantation. See R.643 at p. 197. 
13. At trial, Mr. West testified that his SCS was not activated at the time 
of the accident, and that when he turned it on the following morning, it was not properly 
blocking his left knee pain. See R.639 at pp. 37-38. 
14. However, there is no record that Mr. West complained of any knee 
pain or poor coverage from his SCS when he sought medical treatment the day after the 
accident for injuries allegedly sustained in the accident. See R.643 at pp.202-03. 
15. During the trial, Holley presented testimony through the cross-
examination of the Wests' own expert on spinal cord stimulators, Dr. Lynn Webster, 
regarding how easy it is for the leads of a spinal cord stimulator to migrate during simple 
everyday activities like reaching, stretching, and bending. See jd- at p.201. 
16. Dr. Webster testified that it was possible Mr. West's SCS lead could 
have migrated during the accident, but conceded that he could not say to a reasonable 
degree of medical probability that it had, in fact, migrated as a result of the accident. See 
id. R.643 at p. 194. 
17. Dr. Webster also testified that when a lead is not anchored down 
during implantation surgery (as was the case here), the possibility for migration from 
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simple daily activities is even greater. See id- at pp. 197-98. In fact, Dr. Webster himself, 
in an attempt to minimize migration, sometimes uses two anchors when implanting the 
leads of the SCS. See id. 
18. Holley also presented testimony through the cross-examination of 
Mr. West's chiropractor, Jerry Clark, regarding his use of a Medex machine to isolate the 
muscles of Mr. West's spine and flex and extend it while exerting great force with 
weights on it. See R.638 at pp.210-23. 
19. Mr. West treated with chiropractor Clark several times, from January 
to May 2000. See R.638 at pp.134 and 165. 
20. Mr. Clark testified that he had "no idea" how easy or how difficult it 
is for an SCS lead to migrate during chiropractic spinal manipulations. Id. at p.232. 
21. In addition, Holley presented unrefuted expert testimony through 
accident reconstructionist Ronald Probert and biomechanical engineer David Ingebretsen 
regarding the extremely minor forces involved in this parking lot accident. Both of those 
experts testified that the transmitted forces in this accident from Holley in his Toyota 
Paseo to the Wests' bodies in their vehicle, a Ford Explorer, was only between 2 and 4 
mph. See R.639 at p. 115; R.645 at pp.86-87. 
22. Mr. Ingebretsen also testified that the Wests were in a Ford Explorer 
that weighed almost twice as much as Holley's Toyota Paseo. See R.645 at pp.130 and 
229. 
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23. Holley presented further testimony through Mr. Ingebretsen 
regarding the direction Mr. West's low and mid spine moved in the accident. He 
explained that there was virtually no vertical motion on Mr. West's spine; just horizontal 
motion of only a few inches into the seatbelt. See R.645 at p. 106. 
24. At trial, Mr. West claimed almost $23,000.00 in total medical 
expenses (about $10,000 for care in Utah), $165.00 in travel expenses to and from the 
chiropractor and other doctors, $21,000.00 in lost income, and $900.00 in lost tuition. 
See R.645 at pp. 184-213. 
25. Mrs. West claimed over $5,000.00 in medical expenses, which was 
mostly for short-term chiropractic care. See id- at p.215. 
26. The Special Verdict form asked the jury to determine the amount of 
special damages it believed arose from the accident that were incurred by Mr. West in 
Idaho, where most of his treatment for the SCS reimplantation occurred, and those that 
were incurred by him in Utah, where he had predominantly chiropractic care. See R.434. 
27. The jury awarded Mr. West $8,040 for medical special damages 
incurred in Utah and nothing for medical special damages incurred in Idaho. See id. The 
jury awarded Mrs. West $3,000 in medical special damages. See R.432. The jury also 
determined that Mr. West was responsible for 5% of the overall negligence that 
proximately caused the Wests' injuries. See R.432-434. Finally, the jury awarded the 
Wests $1.00 each in general damages. See id. 
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28. The Wests' counsel asked the jury to be polled. With respect to 
liability, the jury was unanimous; with respect to general damages, seven of the eight 
jurors agreed. After the poll was taken, the Wests' counsel did not object to the jury 
being dismissed. See R.645 at pp.263-276. 
29. On September 20, 2001, the Wests filed a Motion for Additur or in 
the Alterative Motion for New Trial or Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict ("Motion 
for Additur or New Trial") attacking for the first time the sufficiency of the verdict on the 
following grounds: 1) the general damages awarded by the jury were inconsistent with the 
special damages awarded; and 2) no competent evidence supported the jury's failure to 
award Mr. West his medical expenses in Idaho, which related to the SCS claim. See 
R.447-465 . 
30. The Wests' Motion for Additur or New Trial also questioned the 
conduct of Susan Weinmuller, one of the jurors that heard the case. See id. Specifically, 
the Wests alleged that juror Weinmuller improperly relied on discussions about the case 
with her daughter and husband, and that she failed to answer truthfully during voir dire. 
See id. 
31. After full briefing and oral argument, the trial court issued a detailed 
Memorandum Decision on December 7, 2001, ruling that: 1) "[t]he jury's verdict of 
limited special damages for chiropractic care and nominal damages for pain and suffering 
is supported by reasonable inferences derived from the evidence presented," and 2) "the 
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jury decision to exclude from special damages the medical expense associated with the 
spinal cord stimulator are reasonably supported by the evidence." R.594-95. The trial 
court then denied the Wests' Motion for Additur or New Trial based upon the sufficiency 
of the verdict. See R.595. 
32. With respect to the issues surrounding alleged juror misconduct, the 
court withheld ruling, indicating that limited questioning would be required of juror 
Weinmuller on two very narrow issues. See R.592-94. Specifically, regarding alleged 
juror misconduct during voir dire, the court indicated that it needed to question juror 
Weinmuller about whether she answered honestly the question regarding prior 
involvement in civil lawsuits. See R.594. Regarding alleged juror misconduct during 
deliberations, the court indicated that it needed to question juror Weinmuller "on the 
existence and impact of discussions about the case with her husband and/or daughter 
before deliberations." R.592. The Wests made no objection to the limited scope of the 
questioning as outlined in the Memorandum Decision any time prior to the hearing. 
33. The hearing on the issues of alleged juror misconduct was held 
December 12, 2001. See R.637. Prior to the hearing, counsel for both sides submitted 
voir dire questions to be asked of juror Weinmuller. See R.599-604. As it said it would, 
the court conducted the voir dire. See R.637 at p.4. At the close of the hearing, the court 
asked counsel whether any further questions were necessary. See id- at p. 11. Counsel for 
the Wests first requested that the court follow up on the potential bias the juror might 
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have against people who have made workers' compensation claims, which the court did. 
See jd- Counsel for the Wests then indicated that it had "one more question," id., which 
dealt with whether juror Weinmuller had concerns about giving awards for general 
damages. See kl at p. 12. Counsel for Holley objected, arguing that the question went 
beyond the scope of the hearing, and the court agreed. See id- Juror Weinmuller was 
excused and counsel for the Wests then made a record with regard to their objections. 
See id. 
34. Following counsel's comments, the court ruled from the bench, 
stating that it was very clear there was no juror misconduct during jury deliberations. See 
M. at p. 18. Concerning the issue of alleged juror misconduct on voir dire, the court 
indicated there was some confusion on the law in Utah, but that the clear precedent by the 
United States Supreme Court requires both (1) a misstatement of material fact on voir 
dire, and (2) which must have supplied a basis for a challenge for cause. See jd. The 
court then stated: "I'm finding that Counsel would have had a strong basis and reason to 
exercise a peremptory challenge, but that the evidence and the [juror's] response would 
not have risen to a challenge for cause. And because of that I'm going to find that the 
prongs were not satisfied and deny the motion for a new trial." Id. at pp.20-21. 
35. On February 26, 2002, the court entered its Order Denying Plaintiffs' 
Motion for a New Trial Based on Juror Misconduct, reiterating its prior ruling from the 
bench. Specifically, the Order reads: "plaintiffs' counsel may have had a reason to use a 
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peremptory challenge" during voir dire on juror Weinmuller, but the court '"would not 
have sustained a challenge for cause to dismiss juror Weinmuller" because, although juror 
Weinmuller did not disclose her prior business's workers compensation claims on voir 
dire, the court "believes she would have been able to fairly evaluate the evidence 
presented in this case and make an impartial determination about whether to award pain 
and suffering damages to plaintiffs." R.619. 
36. The Wests filed a Notice of Appeal on March 28, 2002. See R.622-
23. 
V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court properly refused to grant to grant additur, or in the 
alternative a new trial, on the general damages of $1.00 that the jury awarded the Wests. 
First, the Wests waived their right to argue insufficiency of damages on appeal by not 
objecting to the general damages award before the jury was discharged. Second, the 
evidence at trial demonstrated that the Wests did not suffer substantial damages as a result 
of the minor impact traffic accident. Accordingly, this Court should affirm, finding that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Wests' Motion for Additur or 
New Trial. 
2. The trial court properly refused to grant additur, or in the alternative 
a new trial, for the jury's refusal to award appellant Stephen West any damages related to 
his SCS claim. The evidence presented at trial led the jury to reasonably conclude that 
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the movement of the SCS leads was totally unrelated to the car accident. Therefore, the 
jury's decision to exclude the medical expenses associated with the SCS claim was 
reasonably supported by the evidence and this Court should affirm the trial court's denial 
of the Motion for Additur or New Trial on that basis. 
3. The trial court properly conducted post-impanelment questioning of 
juror Weinmuller regarding her alleged misconduct and biases. Based on the totality of 
the exchanges between the court and juror Weinmuller, it is clear that the court did not 
abuse its discretion in either the form or substance or its questioning. Accordingly, this 
Court should find that the trial court properly conducted the post-impanelment 
questioning. 
4. The trial court properly determined that no sufficient basis existed 
which would have required striking juror Weinmuller for cause. The court was able to 
observe juror Weinmuller's responses during post-impanelment questioning, found them 
to be credible and sincere, and determined that it would not have sustained a challenge for 
cause. In addition, the Wests are not able to demonstrate that the trial court abused its 
considerable discretion in this matter. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the trial 
court's determination that it would not have sustained a challenge for cause. 
5. The trial court properly determined that the Wests were not entitled 
to a new trial because it would not have dismissed juror Weinmuller for cause during voir 
dire. First, the Wests failed to demonstrate that a correct response by juror Weinmuller 
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would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. In addition, the Wests also 
failed to demonstrate how their inability to use a peremptory challenge to strike juror 
Wehrmuller resulted in prejudice to them. Therefore, this Court should affirm the trial 
court's denial of the Wests' Motion for New Trial Based on Juror Misconduct. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
ISSUE I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GRANT ADDITUR, 
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE A NEW TRIAL, ON THE GENERAL 
DAMAGES OF $1.00 THAT THE JURY AWARDED THE WESTS. 
The Wests first contend on appeal that the trial court erred in not granting 
an additur or new trial on the general damages of $1.00 that the jury awarded them. See 
Wests' Brief at p. 19. Whether the trial court properly denied a motion for additur, or in 
the alternative a new trial, is reviewed "to determine whether the trial court exceeded the 
bounds of its discretion." Neelev v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189, ^ 10, 51 P.3d 724. In 
reviewing the judge's ultimate decision to grant or deny additur or a new trial, this Court 
will reverse only if there is no reasonable basis for the decision. See Crookston v. Fire 
Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 805 (Utah 1991); see also Neelev, 2002 UT App 189 
at TJ10. In this case, the trial court's decision to deny additur or a new trial should be 
affirmed because: (1) the Wests waived their right to argue insufficiency of damages on 
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appeal; and (2) the evidence at trial demonstrated that the Wests did not suffer 
"substantial" damages.1 
A. The Wests Waived Their Right to Argue Insufficiency of Damages on 
Appeal. 
Rule 41(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides the means by 
which an insufficient verdict may be corrected. That rule reads: 
If the verdict rendered is informal or insufficient, it may be 
corrected by the jury under the advice of the Court, or the jury 
may be sent out again. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 47(r). However, a party who fails to object to the informality or 
insufficiency of the verdict before the jury is discharged waives the right to object later. 
See Langton v. International Transport, 26 Utah 2d. 452, 491 P.2d 1211, 1215 (Utah 
1971). 
In our case, after the jury first returned the special damages verdicts for the 
Wests and awarded no money at all for general damages, the court admonished the jury 
that because special damages were awarded, the law requires that some amount in general 
damages must also be awarded, although it could be "nominal damages as low as a dollar, 
1
 The Wests also attempt to argue, without any support, that because they met the 
$3,000.00 medical expenses threshold to maintain a cause of action for general damages 
under Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309, they are deemed to have suffered "substantial" 
special damages, thereby entitling them to more in general damages. See Wests' Brief at 
p.23. That argument is without merit. Just because a plaintiff sustains $3,000 in medical 
expenses does not mean he or she is "entitled" to recover more than nominal pain and 
suffering damages; the fact finder must determine what amount, if any, it believes is 
warranted based on the evidence. 
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or it can be whatever appropriate amount you determine, but it cannot be zero." R.645 at 
p.263. After another deliberation, the jury then returned with a nominal general damages 
award of $1.00. See R.432-35. After learning of the amount of all damages awarded by 
the jury, and despite being given the opportunity, counsel for the Wests made no 
objection to the sufficiency of the verdict before the jury was discharged. See R.263-76. 
In Cohn v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 537 P.2d 306 (Utah 1975), this Court dealt 
with a similar situation. There, plaintiff slipped and fell on premises occupied by 
J.C. Penney. See id. at 307. The jury found the defendant negligent and awarded 
damages as follows: 
Medical expenses $ 352.25 
Loss of income 656.00 
General damages None 
See jd. Plaintiff later moved for a new trial claiming inadequacy of general damages. 
See jd- However, plaintiff made no objection to the verdict when it was rendered. See id. 
at 311-12. After the jury was polled, the trial court asked counsel if they had anything to 
present to the court, and both responded in the negative. See id. at 311. The Utah 
Supreme Court held plaintiff waived her right to challenge the verdict by a motion for 
new trial. See id. at 311-12. The court reasoned as follows: 
The verdict was deficient in form, and counsel had an 
opportunity to have the jury sent back for further 
deliberations. This he did not do, perhaps fearing that the jury 
might either award some nominal amount or even change the 
verdict and award nothing to the plaintiff. It would be a smart 
trial tactic if he could have had a new trial on damages only 
17 
before a jury which would not be acquainted with the 
weakness of plaintiff s cause of action. 
Id. 
In Langton v. Internal 1 Transport, Inc., 26 Utah 2d 452, 491 P.2d 1211 
(1971), the Utah Supreme Court reached the same decision on nearly identical facts to 
this case. Plaintiff allegedly sustained injuries in an automobile accident. See id. at 1212. 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against defendant as follows: 
General damages: $ None 
Special damages: 868.25 
Property damages: 600.00 
TOTAL: $1,468.25 
See id. at 1213. The jury was polled and the trial court asked each counsel whether he 
had anything else to present to the court. See jd- Both responded in the negative. See id. 
Subsequently, plaintiff moved for a new trial, which was denied. See id. The appeal 
followed, and even though the Utah Supreme Court believed the verdict was defective 
and insufficient because it made an award of special damages and no general damages, it 
held that plaintiff waived his right to request a new trial or an additur by not asserting an 
objection under Rule 47(r) before the jury is discharged. See id. at 1215. The court then 
offered the following commentary on the plaintiffs failure to object: 
If counsel be permitted to remain mute when a verdict is 
insufficient or informal, he gains an unfair strategic 
advantage, which the instant case clearly illustrates. . . . 
It would be most advantageous to plaintiff to be granted a 
new trial, particularly if it were limited to the issue of 
damages. In either event, he would have an opportunity to 
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present his case to a new jury. . . . The silence of plaintiff s 
counsel, upon hearing the verdict, is comprehensible, he could 
reasonably have concluded that the jury was unsympathetic to 
his cause or parsimonious, and he would, of course, prefer a 
new jury. There must be reasonable rules to control the 
termination of litigation, if counsel has an opportunity to 
correct error at the time of its occurrence and he fails to 
do so, any objection based thereupon is waived. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The Court in Ute-Cal Land Dev. Corp. v. Sather, 605 P.2d 1240, 1248 
(Utah 1980) also held that the plaintiff waived the right to request a new trial or additur 
by failing to object when the verdict was rendered. Plaintiff filed its motion for new trial 
under Rule 59(a)(5), alleging the verdict awarded insufficient damages and contending 
specifically that evidence introduced at trial rendered the jury's verdict inconsistent with 
the evidence and against Utah law. See id- at 1247. This Court held: 
The plaintiff was under a responsibility to object to this patent 
insufficiency at the time the verdict was rendered. Since the 
plaintiff did not avail himself of the opportunity to object 
to the verdict before the jury was dismissed, any later 
objection to its insufficiency is waived. 
Id. at 1258 (emphasis added). 
In our case, the Wests failed to object to the verdict when it was rendered. 
They requested that the jury be polled and afterward, despite clear opportunities to do so, 
consented to the jury being discharged. Now they argue that the approximately $8,000.00 
and $3,000.00 special damages awards and $1.00 general damages awards are 
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inconsistent with Utah law. The Wests now appeal the trial court's denial of the Motion 
for Additur or New Trial, arguing the total award was insufficient. 
Rule 41(f) provides a clear remedy for an insufficient verdict, and the 
Wests' failure to exercise that right at the proper time was a waiver of their objection. 
Appellants should not now be allowed to gain a tactical advantage through their failure to 
object. Therefore, for the same reasons expressed in Cohn, Langton, and Ute-Cal Land 
Dev., this Court should affirm the trial court's denial of the Wests' Motion for Additur or 
New Trial. 
B. The Evidence at Trial Demonstrated That the Wests Did Not Suffer 
"Substantial" Damages As a Result of the Minor Impact Accident 
Even if this Court were to determine that the Wests preserved their 
objections to the sufficiency of the verdict, the trial court's decision to deny their Motion 
should still be affirmed for the reasons supported by the evidence and reiterated by the 
court. In ruling on this issue in its Memorandum Decision dated December 7, 2001, the 
trial court stated: 
A review of the evidence as presented demonstrates that the 
jury awarded damages resulting from chiropractic care in 
Utah but no expenses related to re-implantation of the spinal 
cord stimulator in Mr. West which occurred in Idaho. The 
treating chiropractor in this case testified that both Plaintiffs 
followed his prescribed course of treatment and received full 
recovery. The evidence of pain and suffering was almost 
exclusively limited to the suffering the Plaintiff has received 
by virtue of a condition sometimes referred to as "CRIPs" 
which had afflicted Mr. West since sometime after an 
accident he suffered as a teenager. Treatment, for Mr. West, 
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consisted of implantation of a spinal cord stimulator device to 
modify his pain response by the introduction of an electrical 
impulse. His theory during this trial was that as a result of the 
accident the leads for that device were moved rendering the 
treatment ineffective. It is apparent from the verdict that the 
jury rejected this factual proposition. The leads were not 
anchored and the experts testified that they could be moved 
with relative ease. The treatment procedure described by the 
chiropractor could certainly have been responsible for the lead 
migration. The jury obviously concluded that although the 
accident caused the need for some chiropractic care the 
accident did not, by itself, occasion substantial pain and 
suffering. . . . The jury's verdict of limited special damages 
for chiropractic care and nominal damages for pain and 
suffering is supported by reasonable inferences derived from 
the evidence presented and, therefore, the motion for Additur 
or for a New Trial on this Point is denied. 
R.595-96. This court should affirm the trial court's decision denying the motion because 
the Wests cannot demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion. Specifically, the 
facts adduced at trial clearly demonstrated that the accident did not cause substantial pain 
and suffering, and thus the nominal damages award was appropriate. In addition, Jury 
Instruction No.31 provided that if the jury did not find that the evidence before them was 
sufficient to show that plaintiffs have sustained any substantial damages, then they could 
return a verdict for the plaintiffs on one or more theories of liability and fix the amount of 
general damages in a nominal sum, such as $1.00. See R.399. 
With regard to Mrs. West, Dr. Moress testified that when he examined her, 
she appeared to be comfortable-not in any physical pain. See R.644 at p.31. In addition, 
Dr. Moress diagnosed Mrs. West with only a chronic soft tissue strain of her neck. See 
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id. He further indicated that Mrs. West complained of having headaches only once a 
month, and that she suffered only a light pain in her neck. See id- at p.32. Moreover, Dr. 
Moress was unable to find any objective findings of pain with respect to the cervical 
diagnosis or headaches. See id. Finally, Dr. Moress testified that, had she been his 
patient, he would have simply recommended anti-inflammatory medication, ice, and 
given her an exercise pamphlet so that Mrs. West could do home exercises. See id. at 
pp.34-35. If Mrs. West were not feeling better after approximately one week, Dr. Moress 
would have then recommended approximately nine sessions of physical therapy at $100 
per session. See id- at pp.35-38. 
In addition, the record also reveals that Mrs. West frequently rated her 
cervical pain at only a two on a scale of zero to ten, zero being no pain and ten being 
excruciating pain. See R.645 at p.38. With regard to her headaches, it was fairly clear 
that Mrs. West exaggerated at trial the frequency of her headaches, being contradicted by 
her own deposition testimony. See id- at pp.40-41. 
With regard to Mr. West, Dr. Moress testified that he diagnosed him with a 
chronic soft tissue sprain and, had Mr. West been his patient, he would have treated him 
just like Mrs. West, with ice, heat, anti-inflammatory medication, home exercises, and 
physical therapy if the symptoms did not resolve themselves. See R.644 at pp.52-53. 
Furthermore, Dr. Moress testified that Mr. West had a number of psychological factors, 
not associated with the automobile accident, that could have been contributing to his pain, 
including marital and financial stress, and depression. See jd. at pp. 104-05. Mr. West 
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himself testified that he had not complained of back pain for months before he saw Dr. 
Moress, and probably not even since he had last seen Jerry Clark, the chiropractor, a few 
months after the accident. See id. at p.l 11. More importantly, however, and as the trial 
court observed, most of the evidence regarding Mr. West's pain and suffering was 
associated with the lack of coverage of his knee pain by his SCS, which the jury 
obviously did not believe was caused by the motor vehicle accident. See R.595. 
Simply stated, the Wests cannot demonstrate that they suffered substantial 
damages or that the trial court abused its discretion in denying their Motion for Additur or 
New Trial after the jury awarded general damages in the nominal sum of $1.00, which 
was outlined in the Stipulated Jury Instruction No. 31. See R.399. 
ISSUE II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GRANT ADDITUR, 
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE A NEW TRIAL, FOR THE JURY'S REFUSAL 
TO AWARD MR. WEST ANY DAMAGES RELATED TO 
HIS SPINAL CORD STIMULATOR CLAIM. 
The second issue the Wests argue on appeal is that the trial court erred by 
not granting an additur, or in the alternative a new trial, for the jury's refusal to award Mr. 
West any damages related to his SCS claim. See Wests' Brief at p.25. Specifically, the 
Wests contend "there was no testimony or evidence to contradict Mr. West's three expert 
witnesses who testified the spinal cord stimulator was damaged in the collision." Id. 
Whether the trial court properly denied a motion for additur, or in the alternative a new 
trial, is reviewed "to determine whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of its 
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discretion." Neelev, 2002 UT App 189 at ^10. In reviewing the judge's ultimate decision 
to grant or deny a new trial, this Court will reverse "only if there is no reasonable basis 
for the decision." Crookston, 817 P.2d at 805 (emphasis added); see also Neelev, 2002 
UTAppl89at^lO. 
In denying the Wests' Motion, the trial court stated: 
As noted above, the medical experts did testify that the 
stimulator leads were not anchored and could be moved with 
relative ease. Certain normal daily tasks or flexion in a given 
direction could have cause the leads to migrate. The 
Chiropractor testified that although he knew about the 
implanted control device, and avoided manipulation near that 
item, he appeared to have no idea about the fragility of the 
leads. Moreover, the description of his treatment indicated 
that the leads could have easily migrated during that process. 
The Court concludes that the jury decision to exclude from 
special damages the medical expense associated with the 
spinal chord stimulator [is] reasonably supported by the 
evidence and denies the motion for additur or new trial on this 
point. 
R.594-95. This Court should affirm that decision because the Wests cannot demonstrate 
that it was without a reasonable basis. See Crookston, 817 P.2d at 805. 
First, the Wests' characterization that they had three "expert witnesses" who 
testified that the SCS was damaged in the collision with Holley is inaccurate. See Wests' 
Brief at p.25. As a point of clarification, the only expert the Wests called at trial was Dr. 
Lynn Webster, who testified as an SCS expert. No other "expert" was called by the 
Wests, and the "testimony" from two other medical providers came in through their 
records; they were never qualified as "experts." 
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In addition, there was persuasive evidence at trial contradicting Mr. West's 
SCS claims elicited from Mr. West's own expert, Dr. Webster. Specifically, Dr. Webster 
testified that there was no indication in the medical records that Mr. West complained of 
knee pain or poor coverage by the SCS lead when he sought medical treatment the day 
after the accident. See R.643 at pp.202-03. The jury heard evidence that Mr. West's SCS 
leads had not been anchored down when they were implanted, making them particularly 
vulnerable to migration. See R.643 at pp. 197-98, 202. Moreover, Dr. Webster 
acknowledged that Mr. West's SCS leads could have migrated simply by reaching for a 
can of soup in the refrigerator, bending to tie his shoes, or twisting to say hello to 
somebody. See id- at p.201. Finally, not even Dr. Webster could testify to a reasonable 
degree of medical probability that the migration of the SCS lead occurred as a result of 
the automobile accident. See id. at p. 194. When asked that question specifically while 
looking at the x-rays, Dr. Webster responded, "I think that I can say with a reasonable 
degree of possibility there is migration." Id. (emphasis added). These rather numerous 
uncertainties allowed the jury to find that the leads had migrated by some other means, a 
reasonable inference given Dr. Webster's own testimony on the matter. Even with their 
own expert, the Wests did not prove to the jury by a preponderance of the evidence that 
this motor vehicle accident caused the SCS leads to migrate. 
Holley also presented testimony through the cross-examination of Mr. 
West's chiropractor, Jerry Clark, regarding his use of a Medex machine to isolate the 
muscles of Mr. West's spine and flex and extend it while exerting great force on it. See 
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R.638 at. pp.210-23. While Mr. Clark was aware of the SCS and did not actively try to 
manipulate the implantation area, see id- at pp. 197-200, when asked if he knew how easy 
or difficult it is for a lead to a SCS to move, he responded: "I have no idea about leads 
and spinal cord stimulators. That is out of my area." Id. at p.232. 
The Wests argue that the trial court erred in placing any reliance on Mr. 
Clark's chiropractic care to support the jury's verdict finding that the leads to the SCS did 
not migrate as a result of the accident and that one plausible explanation for the migration 
was this force exerted on Mr. West's spine. See Wests' Brief at p.28. Specifically, the 
Wests argue that Mr. Clark took an x-ray before he treated Mr. West, and that expert 
testimony demonstrates the x-ray showed migration of the leads occurred before the 
chiropractic care began. See id- That argument again mischaracterizes the evidence. Dr. 
Webster testified that the x-ray referred to by the Wests was taken by inferior equipment 
and with poor technique. See R.643 at p. 182. Based on the poor x-ray, Dr. Webster 
could only conclude "it (referring to the leads) appears it's moved a little." Id. Such a 
statement far from conclusively establishes that Mr. Clark's chiropractic treatments had 
no relation to the obvious migration of the leads that showed up on good x-rays several 
months later. 
Holley also presented unrefuted expert testimony through accident 
reconstructionist Ronald Probert and biomechanical engineer David Ingebretsen 
regarding the extremely minor forces involved in the parking lot accident. Both of these 
witnesses testified that the transmitted forces in this accident to the Wests' bodies in their 
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vehicle was only between 2 and 4 mph. See R.639 at p.l 15; R.645 at pp.86-87. Holley 
presented further testimony from Mr. Ingebretsen regarding the fact that the Wests were 
in a Ford Explorer, which is almost twice as heavy as Holley's Toyota Paseo. See R.645 
at pp.130 and 299. Mr. Ingebretsen also explained the direction that Mr. West's low and 
mid spine moved in the accident, testifying that there was virtually no vertical motion on 
Mr. West's spine, just horizontal motion of only a few inches into the seatbelt. See R.645 
at p. 106. 
In sum, Holley presented sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably 
exclude from special damages the medical expenses associated with Mr. West's SCS 
claims. Accordingly, the trial court had a reasonable basis to deny the Motion for Additur 
or New Trial, which should be affirmed by this Court. 
ISSUE HI 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONDUCTED 
POST-IMPANELMENT QUESTIONING OF JUROR WEINMULLER 
REGARDING HER ALLEGED MISCONDUCT AND BIASES. 
The third issue the Wests argue on appeal is that the trial court improperly 
conducted the post-impanelment questioning of juror Weinmuller by not more thoroughly 
examining her regarding her alleged misconduct and biases. Specifically, the Wests 
argue it was error for the trial court (1) to refuse to ask any questions regarding juror 
Weinmuller's potential bias against awards for general damages, and (2) to refuse to 
inquire about potential conversations she had with other jurors prior to deliberations. See 
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Wests' Brief at p.35. The scope of post-impanelment questioning "'is a matter within the 
sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling with respect thereto will not be disturbed 
absent a demonstrated abuse of discretion.'" Rasmussen v. Sharapata, 895 P.2d 391, 394 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) (quotation omitted). Only when there is a clear indication from the 
record that the decision regarding the scope of questioning was unreasonable can this 
Court find that an error occurred. See id. In this case, because the Wests cannot 
demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in examining juror Weinmuller, this 
Court should not find that the court erred. 
Utah Rule of Evidence 606(b) provides: 
Upon an inquiry into the validity of the verdict or indictment, 
a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring 
during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of 
anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as 
influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or 
indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in 
connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the 
question whether extraneous prejudicial information was 
improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any 
outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any 
juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any 
statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the 
juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these 
purposes. 
Utah R. Evid. 606(b). It was within the bounds of this rule that the trial court decided it 
needed to conduct very limited questioning of juror Weinmuller before deciding the 
Wests' Motion for Additur or New Trial. See R.591-94. 
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In its Memorandum Decision dated December 7, 2001, the trial court 
indicated that the questioning of juror Weinmuller it planned to conduct would be on only 
two narrow issues. See id- Specifically, the court would inquire of juror Weinmuller: (1) 
whether she failed to answer honestly the voir dire question concerning prior lawsuits 
involving herself or close family members; and (2) whether she improperly relied on 
discussions with her husband and daughter during deliberations. See id- At no time 
before the hearing did the Wests make any objection to the trial court's approach to the 
limited scope of the hearing as outlined in its Memorandum Decision. 
On December 12, 2001, the court conducted the hearing on the two narrow 
issues of alleged juror misconduct. See R.637. At the hearing, the court questioned juror 
Weinmuller in depth regarding her experience with previous lawsuits and whether she 
had any discussions with her husband or daughter about this lawsuit prior to its 
termination. See id- at pp.5-11. After the trial court's voir dire, the court asked whether 
counsel had any other matters it would like to follow up on. See id- at p. 11. The Wests' 
counsel indicated that he would like the court to question juror Weinmuller on her ability 
to judge this case on its own merits, which the court did. See jd- Counsel for the Wests 
then indicated that he had "one more question," which dealt with juror Weinmuller's 
alleged concerns of giving awards for general damages. See id. at pp.11-12. The court 
declined to ask the question, agreeing with counsel for Holley that it went beyond the 
scope of the hearing. See ]d. at p. 12. The Wests made no objection. See jd- Before juror 
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WeinmuUer was excused, the Wests made no request for the court to question her 
regarding any alleged improper conversations she may have had with other jurors prior to 
deliberations. S^e id- The court excused juror WeinmuUer from the hearing. See id. 
In this case, it is clear that the scope of the trial court's questioning was not 
unreasonable, and it properly dealt with the matters that the court previously indicated 
were necessary to decide the motion. Specifically, the court was able to elicit enough 
information to deteimine whether or not juror WeinmuUer's experiences and resultant 
feelings with her company's prior lawsuits in California would have been sufficient to 
dismiss her for cause. See id- at pp.5-21. In addition, the court, through its questions, 
was able to determine that juror WeinmuUer had absolutely no conversations with her 
husband or daughter prior to the termination of the case. See id. 
The Wests' desire for further questioning of juror WeinmuUer after she had 
been dismissed was simply not proper for at least two reasons. First, the Wests failed to 
either object or raise the issues before juror WeinmuUer was dismissed from the hearing, 
and thereby waived their right to argue the issue on appeal. Second, the Supplemental 
Affidavit of Juror Stacie Bersie, whose original Affidavit provided the basis for the Wests 
Motion for Additur or New Trial, clarified that she never actually observed juror 
WeinmuUer engage in discussion with another juror before deliberations began, and that 
juror WeinmuUer's opinions during deliberations certainly never prevented any other 
juror from asserting their own opinions. See R.477-78. Simply stated, "[b]ased on the 
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totality of the exchanges between the trial court, counsel, and [juror Weinmuller, this 
Court] cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in either the form or substance of its 
questioning." Rasmussen, 895 P.2d at 395. Accordingly, this Court should find that the 
trial court properly conducted post-impanelment questioning of juror Weinmuller. 
ISSUE IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT NO 
SUFFICIENT BASIS EXISTED WHICH WOULD HAVE 
REQUIRED STRIKING JUROR WEINMULLER FOR CAUSE. 
The next issue the Wests argue on appeal is that the trial court erred by not 
finding juror Weinmuller's experience with worker's compensation claims provided a 
sufficient basis for a challenge for cause. See Wests' Brief at p.38. "The law on voir dire 
of jury panels is instructive in helping us assess whether post-impanelment questioning of 
a juror was proper. The scope of such questioning 'is a matter within the sound discretion 
of the trial court, and its rulings with respect thereto will not be disturbed on appeal 
absent a demonstrated abuse of discretion.'" Rasmussen, 895 P.2d at 394 (quotation 
omitted); see also State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, ^25, 24 P.3d 948 (stating "[w]e start with 
the traditional and sound rule that a trial court's detennination of whether to excuse a... 
juror for cause should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. We review such a 
decision with just deference because of the 'trial judge's somewhat advantaged position 
in determining which persons would be fair and impartial jurors.'") (quotation omitted). 
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The United States Supreme Court in McDonough Power Equipment v. 
Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556, 104 S.Ct. 845, 850 (1984), determined that to obtain a 
new trial because a juror has given a mistaken response to a question on voir dire, "a 
party must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on 
voir dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis 
for a challenge for cause." While in this case the trial court determined that the first 
prong of the McDonough test was met, the court found that the second prong was not met 
because it would not have sustained a challenge for cause. See R.637 at pp. 18-21. Thus, 
the court denied the Wests' Motion for New Trial. See jd- at p.21. 
Determining whether a juror should be excused for cause is governed by 
Rule 47(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 47(f)(6) provides that a challenge for 
cause may be taken for "[cjonduct, responses, state of mind or other circumstances that 
reasonably lead the court to conclude the juror is not likely to act impartially." Utah R. 
Civ. P.47(f)(6). The Wests contend that it would have been a simple matter for the court 
to replace juror Weinmuller with another juror and that the court's efforts to rehabilitate 
her were insufficient.2 See Wests' Brief at p.41. 
2
 With regard to the Wests' argument against rehabilitating juror Weinmuller, Utah 
law requires trial courts to "expend significant effort" to rehabilitate jurors when an 
inference of bias has attached to them. See Rasmussen, 895 P.2d at 395. In this case, an 
inference of bias attached to juror Weinmuller after she acknowledged that her old 
company in California had previous experiences with lawsuits. The trial court was thus 
required to question juror Weinmuller regarding her ability to set aside those experiences 
and judge this case on its own merits, which it did, and it sufficiently dispelled any 
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At the hearing on December 12, 2001, the court questioned juror 
Weinmuller extensively regarding her experiences with prior lawsuits. See R.637 at pp.5-
11. The juror responded that more than ten years ago she and her husband owned a 
company in California where on several occasions its employees sustained injuries 
outside of the job but subsequently made worker's compensation claims. See |d- at p.8. 
The court, at the request of the Wests' counsel, asked: 
The question is when you made the comment a few moments 
ago that you would have qualified yourself, I think the 
question was-at that time [during voir dire at trial] what I 
would have said was can you set aside whatever experiences 
you have had in California as an employer and these 
Workman Compensation suits and the suit with the 
disgruntled salesperson, set the entire experience aside and 
judge this case based on its own facts and its own merits? 
Id. at p. 11. Juror Weinmuller responded, "[definitely." Id. The court, having had the 
benefit of observing juror Weinmuller in her response to these questions, and recalling the 
full scope of her voir dire during the first day of trial, found that her answers were 
"candid and forthright" and that it would not have sustained a challenge for cause. Id. at 
pp. 19-20. 
The first day of trial, the judge told the venire that this was a traffic accident 
case with a claim for injuries allegedly received in the accident. See R.631 at p. 19. The 
fact that Mr. West made a worker's compensation claim many years prior to the 
inference of bias. 
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automobile accident never came up during voir dire. It came up later during the trial only 
because Mr. West's SCS had been implanted to relieve his knee pain from an earlier 
work-related injury. The venire was asked about any lawsuit in which they had 
personally been involved as a party or as a witness. Juror Weinmuller did not respond 
to this question; however, she did disclose that she was a retired California business 
corporation owner and that she had also owned a property management company in Utah. 
During voir dire, the trial court permitted counsel to approach the bench and posit follow-
up questions, and it conducted further questioning with one juror in chambers. See R.631 
at pp. 80-88. The Wests' counsel was free to follow-up with whether juror Weinmuller's 
businesses had had any worker's compensation or personal injury claims made against 
them. Instead, the Wests' counsel asked nothing, evidencing that even the Wests' counsel 
did not consider worker's compensation even tangentially relevant to this case. In fact, 
potential juror Weinmuller was an appealing prospect for the Wests since the juror's 
mother suffered from the same affliction claimed by Mr. West in his knee, Chronic 
Regional Pain Syndrome. 
Even if juror Weinmuller had spontaneously disclosed that her company in 
California had had worker's compensation claims made against it, this still does not 
tianslate into her being biased against people who are injured in automobile accidents and 
does not mean that she believes all people who bring personal injury lawsuits are engaged 
in a sham. At the time of voir dire, no one believed worker's compensations claims 
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would be of any relevance to the case. If the court had heard of juror Weinmuller's 
previous worker's compensation experience, it would have put little concern on it since it 
was remote in time, this was a traffic accident case, and Mr. West's work-related injury 
was of no import to this case. 
The trial court unequivocally stated it would not have dismissed juror 
Weinmuller for cause and this court should affirm that determination because the Wests 
are unable to demonstrate that the trial court abused its considerable discretion in this 
matter. The court was able to observe juror Weinmuller's responses and found them to be 
credible and sincere. It also recalled her disclosures in voir dire on the first day of trial. 
Based on those collective responses, the court properly determined that the "evidence and 
the response would not have risen to a challenge for cause." Id. at p.20. Accordingly, 
this Court should affirm the trial court's determination that it would not have sustained a 
challenge for cause. 
ISSUE V 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT 
THE WESTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL 
BECAUSE IT WOULD NOT HAVE DISMISSED 
JUROR WEINMULLER FOR CAUSE DURING VOIR DIRE. 
The final issue the Wests argue on appeal is that the trial court improperly 
applied the McDonough test in determining that the Wests were not entitled to a new trial 
since juror Weinmuller would not have been dismissed for cause during voir dire. "The 
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trial court's conclusion that the McDonough test was not satisfied is a legal conclusion 
that we review for correctness, while the trial court's decision to deny [the Wests'] 
motion for a new trial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Evans, 
2001 UT 22426, 20 P.3d 888. 
As discussed above, the McDonough test provides that in order to obtain a 
new trial because a juror has given a mistaken response to a question on voir dire, "a 
party must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on 
voir dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis 
for a challenge for cause." McDonough. 464 U.S. at 556, 104 S.Ct. at 850. 
In this case, the trial court, making specific findings on the record, stated: 
So what I'm leaving on the record is I'm finding that Counsel 
[for the Wests] would have had a strong basis and reason to 
exercise a peremptory challenge, but that the evidence and 
[the juror's] response [to the court's questions] would not 
have risen to a challenge for cause. And because of that I'm 
going to find that the prongs [of the McDonough test] were 
not satisfied and deny the motion for a new trial. 
R.637 at pp.20-21. The court did find that the first prong of the McDonough test was 
satisfied, i.e., juror Weinmuller failed to correctly answer a question on voir dire. See id-
at p. 18. The court expressed uncertainty, however, as to whether this Court's plurality 
opinion in State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243 (1992) required that the omission give rise to a 
challenge for cause or whether a new trial should be granted if there existed a strong 
reason to use a peremptory challenge. See jd- at pp. 16-18. 
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A careful examination of Thomas reveals that the majority of the court 
deciding that case concluded that a juror's omission must give rise to a valid basis for a 
challenge for cause in order for a new trial to be granted. See id- Specifically, Justices 
Zimmerman, Howe, and Hall unequivocally required a showing that a correct response to 
a material question on voir dire would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for 
cause. See id- at pp.250-52. Justice Durham, simply "[t]o accommodate the unusual facts 
of this case," decided to "extend the second prong of the McDonough test to require a 
showing that a correct response would have provided either a valid basis for a challenge 
for cause or that the nondisclosure itself prevented the juror from serving as a fair, 
impartial factfinder." Id. at 248. Finally, only Justice Stewart felt that the second prong 
of the McDonough test could be eliminated entirely in certain circumstances. See id- at 
249-50. Therefore, it is abundantly clear that both prongs of the McDonough test must be 
met in order for the Wests to obtain a new trial in this case. 
The McDonough test is also supported by this Court's recent decision in 
State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, 20 P.3d 888. In Evans, the trial court learned during a 
criminal trial that one of the jurors failed to answer a voir dire question correctly. See jd-
at *J24. Specifically, the juror failed to disclose that she was related to the chief deputy in 
the prosecutor's office. See id. The defendant then moved the trial court to declare a 
mistrial. See id. The court interviewed the juror extensively and determined that the first 
prong of the McDonough test was satisfied. See jd- at ^25. However, the court 
37 
determined that the second prong of the McDonough test was not satisfied because, based 
on the interview with the juror, the court would not have stricken her for cause had the 
relationship been discovered during voir dire. See id- Specifically, the court believed the 
juror to be capable of exercising careful and independent analysis of the evidence and 
there was nothing to suggest that she could not return a verdict free from bias. See id. at 
128. 
This Court, in reviewing that determination, noted that the trial court 
correctly applied the law when it determined that the second prong of the McDonough 
lest was not satisfied because the trial court would not have sustained a challenge for 
cause had the disclosure been made during voir dire. See id- This Court stated: "As a 
result, the trial court was within the range of permitted discretion in denying the 
defendant's motion for mistrial." Id. Accordingly, Evans simply affirms previous 
holdings by this Court requiring that a party first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer 
honestly a material question on voir dire and further show that a correct response 
would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. See id- at ffl]25-28. 
The Wests argue that the trial court in this case erred by refusing to grant a 
new trial because they would have removed juror Weinmuller with a peremptory 
challenge. See Wests' Brief at pp.42-44. Significantly, however, even if they had 
exercised a peremptory challenge on juror Weinmuller, the Wests cannot show how the 
verdict would have been any different. As stated above, the jury was unanimous on the 
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issue of liability and seven of the eight jurors agreed \ v ith gi\ ing tl ic Wests onl> $1 00 in 
genera! dai nages. See R.645 at pp.263- 276. The Wests do not and cannot argue that their 
inability to exercise a peremptory challenge on juror Weinmuller resulted in any prejudice 
to them. Even if juror Weinmuller had not been on the jury panel, six other jurors agreed 
with the verdict on general damages. The verdict would have In i n the saint A illi. oi 
wi Weinmuller. 
The Wests's argument was also addressed by this Court in Evans and 
summarily dismissed based on the facts of that case. See Evans, 2001 UT 22 at 1J29. 
There, the defendant argued that had he known ;,. , a the relat - -
arid tl le chief depi ity pi 'oseci itoi ,, he woi ild. - ^ ** • - .i ; i JI nuiu die panel with a 
peremptory challenge. See kL at ^ 29. Citing State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 400 (Utah 
1994), this Court determined that reversal of the trial court's decision not to grant a 
mistrial was not appropriate because defendant 'Tailed to show how Ins inabihh to use a 
peremptory challenge . . . resulted in (I'leftidfVe " Evans, 2001 U 1 ' 22 at Tf29. 
Just like the defendant in Evans, the Wests are unable to successfully argue 
that a new trial was warranted due to their inability to use a peremptory challenge to 
remove juror Weinmuller. First, it is clear that Evans adds nu nrw inqtiticiiitiih It liu 
McDonough test, Specificall> the McDonough test would have been satisfied and a new 
trial warranted if the Wests could have demonstrated that juror Weinmuller was 
sufficiently biased or partial. The trial court properly held that juror Weinmuller's 
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experiences as a business owner many years ago in California would not have caused it to 
dismiss her for cause in this motor vehicle accident case. Indeed, the trial court would 
have been required to dismiss juror Weinmuller under McDonough if her conduct, 
responses, state of mind or other circumstances led the court to reasonably conclude that 
she was not likely to act impartial. See Utah R. Civ. P. 47(f)(6). Sitting in the best 
position to determine her ability to act as impartial juror, the trial court believed Ms. 
Weinmuller was properly qualified to sit in this case. 
Moreover, Rule 47(f)(6) further provides that a juror should be dismissed 
for cause unless "the judge is convinced the juror can and will act impartially and fairly." 
Id. Finally, according to the rule, even a juror who has formed a negative opinion can 
still be impartial. See Utah R. Civ. P. 47, Advisory Committee Note (stating "no person 
shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having formed an opinion upon the matter if it 
satisfactorily appears to the court that the person will, notwithstanding that opinion, act 
impartially"). 
In this case, the trial court conducted an extensive interview on the record 
with counsel present and determined that the evidence and juror Weinmuller's responses 
did not rise to the level of a challenge for cause. See R.637 at p.20. In other words, as 
the court stated in its Order, while juror Weinmuller's experiences may have made her 
subject to a peremptory challenge, "she would have been able to set aside her experiences 
. . . and fairly evaluate the evidence presented in this case and make an impartial 
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determination . . . ." R.619 Therefore, the Wests cannot demonstrate that juror 
Weimnulk i w .i-. paifnl ni bused mid (his ("otiil '<lniiii.il jlt'inn (In li i.il t .mil's denial of 
the Wests' Motion for New Trial Based on Juror Misconduct. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Holley respectfully requests that this C :)nrt 
affirn - court's denial oi tl le Wests' Motion i 01 A,cidit in 01 New Trial as it i elates 
to issues one and two. With respect to issues three through five, Holley requests that this 
court find that the trial court properly conducted post-impanelment questioning; that no 
sufficient basis existed which would have required striking the juror for cause; and <i.-
the trial court pi opei ly deteirr •• tl iat: the Wests wei e not ei ititled to a i lew trial because 
juror Weinmuller would not have been dismissed for cause. 
DATED this 10th day of February, 2003. 
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Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
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ADDENDUM 
43 
I'liLili llliili (ill I i ill hnml i iM ' I'1 I i i ois. ,' . ' ' •' 
(f) Challenges for cause. A challenge for cause is an objection to a particular 
juror and shall be heard and determined by the court. The juror challenged and any other 
person may be examined as a witness on the hearing of such challenge. A challenge for 
cause may be taken on one or more of the following grounds. On its own motion the 
court may remove a juror upon the same grounds. 
(1) A want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law to render a person 
competent as a juror. 
(2) Consanguinity or affinity within the torn III degree to cither pail\ >i In .in 
officer of a corporation that is a party. 
(3) Standing in the relation of a debtor and creditor, guardian and ward, master 
and servant, employer and employee or principal and agent, to either party, or united in 
business with either party, or being on any bond or obligation for either party; provided, 
that the relationship of debtor and creditor shall be deemed not to exist between a 
municipality and a resident thereof indebted to such municipality by reason of a tax, 
license fee, or service charge for water, power, light or other services rendered to such 
resident. 
(4) Having served as a juror, or having been a witness, on a previous trial 
between the same parties for the same cause of action, or being then a witness therein. 
(5) Pecuniary interest on the part of the juror in the result of the action, or in the 
main question involved in the action, except his interest as a member or citizen of a 
municipal corporation. 
(6) Conduct, responses, state of mind or other circumstances that reasonably 
lead the court to conclude the juror is not likely to act impartially. No person may serve 
as a juror, if challenged, unless the judge is convinced the juror can and will act 
impartially and fairly. 
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